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Abstract. This study uses matching to evaluate the effect of decoupled payments on the acreage 
response of Iowa farmers who were in business in 1997 and 2002. Using farm-level panel data 
from the U.S. Agricultural Census, we examine whether farmers receiving high levels of 1997 
agricultural payments per acre had a greater increase in program crop acreage between 1997 and 
2002 than farmers receiving low levels of payments. The panel data set allows for conditioning 
current acreage on past individual acreage and operator characteristics. The large and exhaustive 
sample  allows  for  comparisons  across  similar  farms.  The  matching  methodology  avoids 
distributional and functional form assumptions about the relationship between the treatment and 
outcome.  Results  are  consistent  with  other  recent  empirical  estimates  that  suggest  small  but 
statistically significant effects of decoupled payments on production.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Some  agricultural  policy  reforms,  including  the  1996  Federal  Agricultural  Improvement  and 
Reform  (FAIR)  Act,  seek  to  minimize  production  distortions  by  giving  farmers  lump-sum 
payments that are not tied to production decisions or prices. The extent to which these lump-sum 
or  “decoupled”  payments  actually  affect  production  has  been  a  significant  dispute  among 
academics and in recent World Trade Organization negotiations (FAO, 2005; Sumner, 2005).  
Some developing nations contend that the large level of agricultural payments in the United 
States  significantly  influences  production  and  trade.    The  U.S.  has  maintained  that  these 
payments are minimally trade distorting (USTR, 2004).   
Economic theory suggests that lump-sum payments have no effect on production when 
markets are complete.  However, under imperfect labor, credit, or insurance markets, decoupled 
payments  could  influence  supply  (Burfisher  and  Hopkins,  2003;  Chau  and  de  Gorter,  2000; 
Hennessy,  1998;  Roe,  Somwaru,  and  Diao,  2003).    Recently,  there  have  been  several 
econometric  studies  examining  the  link  between  lump-sum  payments  and  production  (For  a 
review see OECD, 2005). Some of these studies have examined the production responses to post-
FAIR Act payments. Though post-FAIR Act payments may not be truly lump sum, the studies 
generally find a positive association between these mostly decoupled payments and production, 
though the magnitude of this association varies substantially (Adams, et. al, 2001; Goodwin and 
Mishra, 2005; Goodwin and Mishra, 2006; Key, Roberts, and Lubowski, 2005).  
In this paper we take a new empirical approach to evaluate the effect of the farm-level 
supply  response  to  decoupled  payments.  We  use  panel  data  from  the  1997  and  2002  U.S. 
Agricultural Census to explore whether 1997 agricultural payments induced farmers to increase   3 
land  allocated  to  program  crops.  Census  data  includes  information  on  the  amount  of  land 
allocated to particular crops and total government payments.  A matching estimator based on the 
propensity score is used to compare the change between 1997 and 2002 in program crop acreage 
of  farms  with  a  high  level  of  1997  payments  per  acre  to  similar  farms  with  a low  level  of 
payments.  This allows us to measure how much the essentially “decoupled” 1997 agricultural 
payments influenced production at the farm level.  The findings should help inform debates on 
future agricultural policy reforms and trade negotiations. 
The paper offers several contributions to the empirical literature. First, the exhaustive 
nature of the Census data used - which includes essentially all U.S. producers of program crops – 
minimizes  measurement  errors  associated  with  sample  design  and  response  rates.  The  large 
sample size and the fact that we limit the sample to a relatively homogenous group of farmers in 
Iowa,  allow  for  comparisons  across  very  similar  farms.  Second,  most  previous  studies  have 
relied  on  a  single  survey  to  estimate  a  cross-sectional  relationship  between  payments  and 
plantings.  If factors correlated with both payment levels and planted acreage are unobservable, 
estimates could be biased. The farm-level panel data set used in this study allows us to estimate 
how different payment levels affect subsequent changes in planting for individual farms. While 
payment levels are likely correlated with contemporaneous plantings, there is no reason to expect 
payments to be correlated with future changes in plantings. Third, the matching methodology 
provides a way to estimate the effect of payments on cropland allocation that does not require 
distributional and functional form assumptions about the relationship between the treatment and 
outcome. 
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2. Empirical Model 
 
Sources of Payment Variation 
The  empirical  approach  is  to  compare  the  change  in  program  crop  acreage  of 
observationally  similar  farms  with  different  levels  of  government  payments  per  acre. A  key 
assumption of this approach is that after controlling for observable differences between farms, 
differences in the payments per acre across farms are not associated with unobservable factors 
that influence the change in program crop acreage over time – in other words there is no sample 
selection bias.
1  We maintain that this assumption is reasonable since much of the variation in 
payments across observationally similar farms (having the same acres of program crops, located 
in  the  same  county,  the  same-age  operator,  etc.)  results  from  a  largely  exogenous  ex-ante 
variation in government payments resulting from differences in base acres and base yields.  
Payments per acre harvested (including base and nonbase acres) vary randomly across 
similar farms in part because of random variation in how a farm’s land is classified – base versus 
nonbase  and  which  type  of  base.    In  the  1980’s,  program  participation  came  with  many 
restrictions: it required farmers to limit their plantings to a share of acres historically planted to 
program crops (called ‘base acres’) and required a certain portion to be set-aside (left fallow). 
These costly restrictions caused some farmers not to participate. In addition, some farmers may 
have strategically chosen not to participate in order to ‘build base’ (payment-qualifying) acres in 
anticipation of higher future payments.  Because payments are tied to historical plantings, and 
participation required farmers to limit plantings, some may have chosen not to participate in 
order to expand acreage and increase expected future payments. Because payments in future 
                                                 
1 More specifically, there is no selection bias among the sample of continuing operations. The sample does not 
include farms that exited or entered between 1997 and 2002, as discussed in the following section.   5 
years were tied to historical plantings, historical plantings were tied to participation decisions, 
and participation varied somewhat across producers, so did payments.  Base acres could also 
vary due to chance variation in rotations between 1981 and 1985, particularly since soybeans 
were  not  considered  a  program  crop  at  that  time.    It  is  unlikely  that  program  participation 
decisions  in  the  early  1980’s  should  be  systematically  associated  with  changes  in  acreage 
between 1997 and 2002, especially since the cropland could have changed hands over that period 
of time. 
A second source of variation in payments per acre for similar farms is differences in base 
yields,  which  affect  payment  levels  on  base  acres.  Base  yields  were  determined  by  realized 
yields between 1981 and 1985.  While yields are clearly tied to land quality, they also vary 
widely from year-to-year and across space, due to weather outcomes.  Indeed, summary statistics 
reported by Roberts, Key and O’Donoghue (2006) indicate that field-level yields are typically 
30% to 50% above or below their mean, and the county-level yield shock accounts for only 
about half the field-level variability. Thus, some variation in base yields, even locally, is likely 
random.
2   
We  reduce  the  likelihood  that  there  are  differences  in  relevant  unobservable  factors 
between the treatment and control groups by choosing a homogenous sample of farmers. Even 
before matching, the characteristics of the operations in our sample with high and low payments 
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Supply response 
This study compares the effect of largely decoupled government payments in 1997 on 
subsequent (2002) program crop acreage. A general farm-level model of program crop acreage 
response over a five-year period can be expressed as: 
 
    ( ) 5 5 5
*
1 5 , 5 , , , , , - - - - - - = t t t t t j t t z W G P AC A f A  
 
Where  t A  is program crop acreage in year t (2002) and  5 - t A is program crop acreage in the 
previous census year (1997).   5 , - t j AC  is acreage of crop j in 1997, which is included as a proxy 
for land quality. Output is a function of the expected output and input prices at the time of 
planting, 
*
1 - t P .  In  the  econometric  specification  used  in  this  paper  we  include  county  fixed 
effects, which should capture the effect of price variation across counties. Price variation within 
a county is likely to be small. In addition, the response of the dependent variable, the aggregate 
program crop acreage, to within-county price variation is likely to small. Wealth in the lagged 
period  5 - t W , is included to allow for the possibility that risk preferences vary with wealth, which 
in turn could affect production decisions. As a proxy for wealth we include total agricultural 
sales,  which  should  be  correlated  with  agricultural  income.
3  Other  operator  and  operation 
characteristics  5 - t z that  might  influence  acreage  decision  include  the  operator  age  and  age-
squared, and a measures of land quality.  
                                                                                                                                                             
2 We do not observe base yields or base acres in the Census data so we cannot use these as instrumental variables. 
3 The census of agriculture does not provide a good measure of wealth. One possible proxy is the value of land and 
building on the operation, but this is only available on the “long form” census questionnaire, which was distributed 
to only about one-third of all operators.    7 
  To minimize issues of measurement error we define a discrete treatment variable  5 - t D : 
indicating payments per acre of program crops harvested in 1997 above the sample median.  The 
control group receives payments per acre in 1997 below the median.  We first estimate a model 
where the functional relationship between the independent variables is assumed linear (OLS): 
 
    ( ) e + = - - - - - 5 5 5 5 , 5 , , , , t t t t j t t z W D AC A f A  
 
A problem with the linear regression model is it imposes strict distributional and functional form 
assumptions about the relationship between the treatment and outcome.  Matching provides a 
more flexible approach. 
 
Matching 
We want to estimate the average effect of a binary treatment (high government payments per 
acre) on a continuous scalar outcome (program crop acreage harvested). Dropping the time 
notation for simplicity, let  i A0  and  i A1  denote the two potential outcomes such that  i A0  is the 
outcome (acreage) of individual i not exposed to the treatment, and  i A1  is the outcome if exposed 
to the treatment. We are interested in the sample-average treatment effect for the treated (what 
was the additional crop acreage harvested for those receiving high payments compared to what it 
would have been had they received low payments), which is given: 
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where  T N  is the number of treated individuals and the where  { } 1 , 0 = i D  is the treatment 
indicator. 
In most policy analysis settings, the sample-average treatment effects cannot be 
computed because we only observe one of the two possible outcomes for each individual. For 
example, if an individual was exposed to the treatment, then we observe  i A1 , but we do not 
observe what the outcome would have been had the individual not received the treatment ( i A0 ). 
The basic idea behind the matching estimator is to estimate  i A0  using the average outcomes of 
similar individuals who were not exposed to the treatment.  Analogously, if we observe the 
outcome for an individual who did not receive a treatment, then we can estimate  i A1  using the 
average of outcome of similar individuals who were exposed.  
  Matching estimators compare outcomes across pairs of “similar” treated and control 
units.  Ideally, pairs would be matched on all relevant observable variables. In practice, matching 
subjects on a vector of characteristics is not computationally feasible with a large sample when 
the number of characteristics is large. Propensity score matching is a method that summarizes the 
characteristics of each observation into a single index (the propensity score) to make matching 
feasible.  Since Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proposed matching individuals based on their 
propensity score – that is, on their probability of receiving the treatment – these methods have 
become increasingly popular in the evaluation of economic policies and medical trials.  
The propensity score is defined as the conditional probability of receiving a treatment 
given pre-treatment characteristics X: 
 
    ( ) [ ] X D E X D X P = = º 1 Pr ) ( ,   9 
 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if exposure to treatment is random within cells defined 
by X then it is also random within cells defined by the values of  ( ) X P .  Hence, if the propensity 
score is known, then the average treatment effect can be estimated as the expected difference in 
outcomes between individuals receiving the treatment and not receiving the treatment, 
conditional on the having the same propensity score.  The average effect of treatment on the 
treated (ATT) can be estimated as: 
 
(1)    ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] [ ] 1 , 0 , 1 0 1 = = - = = i i i i i i i
T D X P D A E X P D A E E t  
 
A probit (or other standard probability model) can be used to estimate the propensity score: 
 
  [ ] ( ) ( ) i i i X h X D F = =1 Pr , 
 
where F denotes the normal c.d.f. and  ( ) i X h  is a function of the covariates. 
  Since the propensity score is a continuous variable, the probability of having two 
observations with the same value of  ( ) X P  is zero.  Consequently, an estimate of the propensity 
score is not sufficient to estimate (1). We use two methods to overcome this problem: 
stratification matching (or blocking) and nearest neighbor matching.   With stratification 
matching the range of the propensity score is divided into intervals such that within each interval 
the treated and control observations have the same average propensity score.   Then, within each 
interval the difference between the average outcomes of the treated and controls is computed.   10 
The ATT is weighted average of the average differences in each block, with the weights given by 
the frequency of the treated observations.  
  The nearest neighbor method matches each treated observation with the control unit with 
the closest propensity score.   Once each treated unit is matched, the difference between the 
outcome of the treated and untreated units is computed, and the ATT is the average of these  T N  
differences. 
  For both methods, the ATT estimator is essentially the difference between two sample 
means, so the variance is calculated using standing methods for differences in means.  Details on 
the implementation of the stratification and nearest neighbor methods used in this study are given 





Farm-level data are from the Agricultural Census maintained by the USDA National Agricultural 
Statistics Service. Census data on farm and operator characteristics are collected every five years 
from essentially all farms in the country.  Since every farm operator must respond to the survey 
(by  law),  we  can  track  operations  across  time,  as  long  as  they  remain  in  business.    Each 
respondent receives a unique Census File Number (CFN) to track the  farm, ranch, or other 
agricultural entity controlled or operated by the individual filing the census.   
To reduce heterogeneity, this study examines only operations in Iowa that harvested at 
least 50 acres in program crop in 1997 that also remained in business in 2002.  In 1997, a total of 
80,402 farmers responded to the census in 1997 in Iowa. Of these 44,269 harvested at least 50   11 
acres of “program crops” (corn, wheat, barley, oats, rice, cotton, and sorghum) in 1997.  Because 
of the special rules that applied to soybeans in 1997, we also separately analyze the effect of 
payments on program crop acres plus soybean acres.  Of these operators, 30,068 remained in 
business after five years, as indicated by their responding to the 2002 census.  To further reduce 
heterogeneity, and to allow us to use corn yields as a measure of land quality, we dropped the 16 
farms that did not grow corn for grain, leaving a final sample of 30,052 farms.   
  Government payments are defined as total payments received for participation in Federal 
farm programs (not including Commodity Credit Corporation loans or crop insurance payments) 
net  of  payments  received  for  participation  in  the  Conservation  Reserve  Program  and  the 
Wetlands Reserve Program.
4  In 1997, these payments derived almost entirely from Production 
Flexibility Contracts (PFC), which were tied to historically enrolled contract acreage, not current 
plantings (USDA, 2008).  For the program acreage analysis, the treatment group consists of 
those that received payments that were above $33.03 per acre of program crops harvested in 
1997. For the program acreage plus soybeans acreage analysis, the cutoff is $18.44 per acre of 
program crops plus soybeans.  
Table 1 provides a comparison of the mean values of variables used in the analysis for the 
payments per program crop acre categories. Note that for most of the operator and operation 
characteristics,  differences  between  the  averages  of  the  treatment  and  control  groups  are 
generally not large, and in most cases would not be considered economically significant (though 
some are statistically significantly different). The first six rows suggest that payments could play 
an economically significant role in acreage response. The treatment (high payments per acre) 
                                                 
4  In  the  1997  census  respondents  were  asked  for  the  “total  amount  received  for  participation  in  Federal  farm 
programs  (not  including  CCC  loans).”  Respondents  were  also  asked  to  provide  “how  much  was  received  for 
participation in the Conservation reserve program and Wetlands Reserve Program (CRP and WRP)?”  The latter was 
subtracted from the former to obtain the measure of payments used in this study.    12 
group increased the amount harvested by 17.5 acres compared to 2.6 acres for the treatment 
group.  In  terms  of  program  crop  plus  soybean  acreage,  the  treatment  group  increased  their 




The first two columns of Table 2 present the results of the linear regression model with 2002 
program crop acres as the dependent variable. Since we control for 1997 program crop acres, the 
positive  (negative)  coefficients  can  be  interpreted  as  increasing  (decreasing)  program  crop 
acreage between 1997 and 2002. Farmers that had more land in farms, and that harvested more 
acres of soybeans, oats, and silage, and fewer acres of hay in 1997 were significantly more likely 
to increase their program crop acres between 1997 and 2002. The age of the operator was also 
important. Program crop acreage expanded with age, but at a decreasing rate. Corn grain yields, 
the proxy for land quality, was also positively correlated with an expansion of program crop 
acreage. Of greatest interest for this analysis, the results indicate that being in the high payments 
per acre category was associated with 12.0 additional acres in program crops over five years. 
The third and fourth columns of table 4 give the results for program crop plus soybean 
acres as the dependent variable. The results of this analysis are very similar: being in the high 
payments per acre category (where the acreage now includes soybeans) was associated with 16.3 
additional acres of program crops and soybeans over five years. 
Table 3 presents the coefficients of the probit models of the propensity scores. The results 
indicate many statistically significant variables, but the model explains only a small share of the 
variation in the dependent variable. This is consistent with our maintained assumption that after   13 
controlling  for  observables,  differences  in  payments  per  acre  in  1997  are  caused  largely  by 
random factors that determined base yields and base acres in 1981-1985.  In other words, if 
random events caused variation in payments per acre in observationally similar farms, then we 
could  not  expect  to  explain  a  farm’s  placement  in  the  high  or  low  payments  category  with 
observables. In other words, the explanatory variables in the probit model cannot explain a lot of 
the variation in the dependent variable because random error associated with the model is large.  
Table 4 gives the estimated average treatment effect for the stratification and nearest 
neighbor  matching  models,  for  program  crops  and  for  program  crops  plus  soybeans.  The 
coefficients of the matching approach can be interpreted the same way as the indicator in the 
linear model. The estimates imply that the treatment (high payments per acre) caused farmers to 
increase their program crop acreage 13.3 – 16.8 acres (5.3 - 6.7 percentage points) more than 
they would have had they received the control (low payments per acre) between 1997 and 2002. 
Estimates also indicate that the treatment increased program crop plus soybean acreage by 17.2 - 
18.9 acres or 3.6 - 4.0 percentage points. 
These results can be compared to those of other studies. The treatment implies an average 
246% increase in payments per harvested acre of program crops (from $15.64 to $54.12 per 
acre). This implies response elasticity of 0.022 – 0.027. In other words, a 10-percent increase in 
payments per acre would result in a 2.2 – 2.7% increase in farm-level supply (land in production) 
over five years.  With soybeans, the elasticity estimates are 0.014 – 0.015. These findings are 
consistent with those of recent studies. Goodwin and Mishra (2006), who pooled several cross-
sectional surveys of farms in the Heartland from 1998-2001, found acreage elasticities for corn 
and soybeans of about 0.01 to 0.03 (p.87) for decoupled AMTA payments.   




This study used farm-level panel data from the US Agricultural Census to examine the acreage 
response over five years of continuing operations to payments that were largely decoupled from 
production. Specifically, it examined whether farmers receiving high levels 1997 agricultural 
payments per acre increased the quantity of land allocated to program crops in 2002 relative to 
those receiving lower levels of payments per acre. The panel data set allows for conditioning 
current acreage decisions on past individual acreage and operator characteristics.  The matching 
methodology used does not require distributional and functional form assumptions about the 
relationship between the treatment and outcome.  For continuing operations, results indicate that 
the growth of total program-crop acreage for farmers receiving a high level of payments would 
be 2.6 to 6.7 percentage points above that for farmers with low payments, depending on the 
model  specification  and  definition  of  program  crops.    These  results  imply  payment  acreage 
elasticities of between 0.014 and 0.027. Our results are consistent with other empirical estimates 
that suggest small but statistically significant farm-level effects of the decoupled payments on 
production.  
It is important to emphasize that this study did not account for the acreage decision of 
farms entering production or the effect of payments on farm exit rates, so it is not possible to 
ascertain how payments would influence total program crop acreage.  Furthermore, to the extent 
that payments cause an increase in plantings of program-related crops, crop prices would fall, 
thereby attenuating an overall increase in aggregate plantings.  However, for continuing farm 
operations, the results suggest that largely decoupled government payments had a small positive   15 
effect on the farm-level supply of program crops.  Because the effect of payments on production 
is uneven across  farms, the effect of farm payments on farm structure could be substantial.  
Recent  studies  have  shown  that  government  payments  might  contribute  to  increased 
concentration  of  production  on  large  operations  (Roberts  and  Key,  forthcoming;  Key  and 
Roberts, 2007). 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Test of Equality of Means by Payment Category, Iowa 
 








       
1997 program crop (acres harvested)  249.3  237.8  4.42 
2002 program crop (acres harvested)  251.9  255.3  -1.04 
Change in program crop acres harvested  2.6  17.5  -7.36 
1997 program crop + soybean (acres harvested)  446.9  441.6  1.09 
2002  program crop + soybean (acres harvested)  472.1  478.4  -1.04 
Change in program crop + soybean acres harvested  25.2  36.8  -3.24 
Government payments ($)  4,055  12,288  -56.17 
Gov. payments per program crop acre  15.64  54.12  -141.7 
Gov. payments per program crop + soybean acre  9.34  30.55  -127.4 
Sales ($)  204,024  222,088  -5.16 
Operator age (years)  49.3  50.8  -10.16 
Land in farm (owned + rented in - rented out, acres)  567.9  554.3  2.44 
Corn (field corn for grain, acres harvested)  243.9  234.2  3.74 
Soybeans (acres harvested)  197.6  203.8  -2.5 
Oats (acres harvested)  4.8  3.2  11.62 
Hay (all types, acres harvested)  20.5  18.8  3.53 
Silage (corn or sorghum for silage, acres harvested)  3.8  4.9  -4.99 
Hogs (hog and pig inventory, head)  219.0  235.1  -1.81 
Cattle (cattle and calf inventory, head)  58.5  59.0  -0.28 
Corn grain yield (bushels per acre harvested)  128.7  133.3  -17.76 
       
Observations  15,026  15,026   
 
Notes: All variables are for 1997 except where noted. Sample described in text. Definition of 
program crops and government payments given in text. The t-statistics is for the test of the null 
hypothesis of equal means from a pooled sample.  
Source: 1997 and 2002 Census of Agriculture.   19 
Table 2. OLS Regression 
 
Dependent Variable:  2002 program crop 
acres 
  2002 program crop + 
soybean acres 
  Coefficient  t-value    Coefficient  t-value 
           
Intercept  197.1  11.5    392.0  12.68 
Treatment indicator (high/low payments 
per acre of program crops)  12.01  6.0 
 
-  - 
Treatment indicator  (high/low payments 
per acre of program crops + soybeans)  -  - 
 
16.34  4.46 
1997 program crop acres  0.063  0.3    -  - 
1997 program + soybean acres  -  -    -0.584  -1.69 
Sales  0.00003  6.0    0.00001  5.06 
Age of operator  -6.798  -13.2    -12.764  -13.71 
Age-squared  0.044  9.0    0.083  9.28 
Land in Farm  0.040  5.7    0.093  7.24 
Corn acres  0.617  3.2    1.582  4.58 
Soybean acres  0.240  19.3    1.346  3.89 
Oat acres  0.425  2.0    0.910  2.37 
Hay acres  -0.145  -4.4    -0.321  -5.43 
Silage acres  0.169  2.5    0.060  0.49 
Hog inventory  0.003  1.6    0.001  0.45 
Cattle inventory  -0.016  -1.6    -0.070  -3.85 
Corn yield  0.270  5.8    0.448  5.3 
County fixed effects  yes      Yes   
           
           
R-square  0.65      0.67   
           
Observations  30,052      30,052   
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Table 3. Probit model of high/low 1997 government payments per acre 
 
Dependent Variable:  Treatment indicator 
(high/low 1997 
payments per program 
crop acre) 
  Treatment indicator 
(high/low 1997 payments 
per program crop + 
soybean acre) 
  Coeff.  z-value    Coeff.  t-value 
           
Intercept  -1.87461  -14.4    -1.79704  -13.72 
1997 program crop acres  -0.00522  -3.21    -  - 
1997 program crop + soybean acres  -  -    -0.00221  -1.48 
Sales  2.02E-07  4.9    2.02E-07  4.84 
Age of operator  0.038229  9.68    0.035722  9.02 
Age-squared  -0.0003  -7.9    -0.00027  -7.1 
Land in Farm  0.000104  1.94    9.38E-05  1.76 
Corn acres  0.003731  2.29    0.002206  1.48 
Soybean acres  0.001095  11.29    0.001465  0.99 
Oat acres  -0.00302  -1.7    -0.00056  -0.34 
Hay acres  0.000788  3.11    0.000653  2.6 
Silage acres  0.002564  4.95    0.002179  4.23 
Hog inventory  3.61E-06  0.32    4.41E-06  0.39 
Cattle inventory  -0.00011  -1.47    -5.9E-05  -0.79 
Corn yield  0.004439  12.53    0.003622  10.19 
County fixed effects  yes      yes   
           
           
Pseudo R-square  0.04      0.06   
           
Observations  30,052      30,052   
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Table 4. Average treatment effect of high payments per acre for those with high payments 
 
Dependent Variable:  2002 program crop 
acres 
  2002 program crop + 
soybean acres 
  ATT  t-value    ATT  t-value 
           
Stratification matching  13.33  3.99    18.93  3.04 
Nearest neighbor matching  16.76  3.56    17.22  1.94 
           
 
 
 
 